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Abstract 
Polls conducted in the UK following the Fukushima nuclear accident (March 2011) 
indicated a fairly muted and temporary shift in public approval of nuclear power. The 
present study investigated how: (a) comparative preferences for nuclear power in the 
UK might have been affected by the accident; and (b) how ‘supporters’ of nuclear 
power reconciled their pro-nuclear attitude in the wake of the disaster. Between-
subjects comparisons with a pre-Fukushima sample revealed our post-Fukushima 
sample to have comparable preferences for nuclear power. Further analysis suggested 
that ‘supporters’ retained their pro-nuclear stance in response to Fukushima by 
emphasising the necessity of nuclear power in the UK context. The implications for 
these findings are discussed. 
 Keywords: Nuclear power; Attitudes; Fukushima; Risk 
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Reconciling nuclear risk: The impact of the Fukushima accident on comparative 
preferences for nuclear power in UK electricity generation. 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Policy and public responses to Fukushima 
The Fukushima nuclear accident (March 11th 2011) prompted a varied energy 
policy response among countries utilising nuclear power or planning nuclear 
programmes. While in some cases the accident stalled or curtailed plans for new 
nuclear power programmes (e.g. Venezuela, Italy) or produced an abrupt and negative 
shift in existing nuclear power programmes (i.e. Belgium, Germany & Switzerland), 
the majority of nations with an existing reliance on nuclear power outlined a 
continuing commitment to its use (e.g. China, France, USA, UK) (see Joskow & 
Parsons, 2012; Ramana, 2013; Wittneben, 2012). 
The public response to the Fukushima accident was equally varied and country 
specific (e.g. Huang et al., 2013; Kim, Kim & Kim, 2013; Poortinga, Pidgeon, 
Capstick & Aoyagi, 2014). Unsurprisingly, public opinion in Japan collapsed in the 
wake of the accident (e.g. Aoyagi, 2013), while Germany and Switzerland also saw 
notable and sustained increases in public opposition in the wake of Fukushima (e.g. 
Siegrist & Visschers, 2013; Srinivasan & Gopi Rethinaraj, 2013; although see 
Visschers & Siegrist, 2013). By contrast, public opinion in other countries (e.g. 
Sweden, France, UK) saw more moderate and/or temporary changes, indicative of the 
fact that supporters of nuclear power in these countries had managed to absorb the 
news of the Fukushima accident and yet retain a positive attitude towards its use in 
power generation.  
The present article seeks to go beyond simple polling data to shed light on the 
processes underlying the responses to the Fukushima accident, specifically within a 
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UK sample recruited at the University of Sheffield. We start by outlining more about 
the nature of pre-and post-Fukushima attitudes towards nuclear power in the UK, 
before reporting on the findings of a survey-based study designed to: (a) learn more 
about the beliefs underlying supporters’ and non-supporters’ (i.e. others) post-
Fukushima attitudes to nuclear power; and (b) establish what impact these beliefs may 
have had upon preferences for nuclear power as an electricity generating option for 
the UK. 
1.2 Public Attitudes to Nuclear Power in the UK 
1.2.1 Pre-Fukushima. Since coming into commercial operation in the 1950s, 
public attitudes towards nuclear power have “waxed and waned” (Corner et al., 2011, 
p.4826), with high profile nuclear incidents (e.g. Chernobyl) and fears of proliferation 
quelling some of the initial enthusiasm for the technology (Eiser, van der Pligt & 
Spears, 1995). From the start of this century until the Fukushima accident, however, 
polls indicated an overall decline in opposition to the technology (e.g. Ipsos MORI, 
2009; Knight, 2005; Pidgeon, Lorenzoni & Poortinga, 2008). Importantly, though, 
research indicated that this decreased opposition might be due in part to an increasing 
‘reluctant acceptance’ of nuclear power due to its potential in tackling perceptively 
larger risks like climate change and energy security (see Bickerstaff, Lorenzoni, 
Pidgeon, Poortinga & Simmons, 2008; Corner et al., 2011). 
1.2.2 Post-Fukushima. There was a dip in public support for nuclear power 
within the UK immediately following the Fukushima accident (see Figure 1); 
however, this dip was only moderate and short-lived (e.g. Foratom, 2014; Ipsos 
MORI, 2011, 2012; Poortinga et al., 2014). The apparently muted impact of 
Fukushima on public opinion was consistent with the political response to the 
accident. At the time of Fukushima, nuclear power accounted for approximately 18% 
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of the electricity generated in the UK (Department of Energy and Climate Change 
[DECC], 2012). Moreover, there was general political support for nuclear power; with 
the then Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government having inherited and 
retained a pro-nuclear policy from the previous Labour administration (see Jones, 
Eiser & Gamble, 2012). Immediately following the events at Fukushima, the UK 
Government was quick to reaffirm its commitment to the use of nuclear power in 
electricity generation; alongside an equally strong commitment to ensuring stringent 
safety, decommissioning, planning and licensing procedures (Office of Nuclear 
Regulation [ONR], 2011a; 2011b).  
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
The moderate effect of Fukushima on UK public opinion, while perhaps 
unanticipated by some, is consistent with some attitude studies conducted in the UK 
post-Chernobyl (see De Boer & Catsburg, 1988; Eiser, Spears & Webley, 1989; Eiser 
et al., 1995). For example, De Boer and Catsburg (1988) noted only temporary shifts 
in British opposition and support for nuclear power following Chernobyl. Likewise, 
Eiser et al. (1989), while observing an overall negative shift in attitudes to nuclear 
power in a community living close to a nuclear power station, noted that this shift was 
fairly small in absolute terms and was strongly related to people’s general attitudes 
towards the technology. That is, individuals with more pro-nuclear attitudes were less 
likely to evaluate Chernobyl as catastrophic compared with those who were more 
anti-nuclear.  Hohenemser and Renn (1988) noted similar stability in post-Chernobyl 
attitudes in some other nations with active nuclear programmes (e.g. USA, France, 
Sweden) (although see also, Renn, 1990). 
Eiser and colleagues (1995) argued that the surprisingly limited impact of the 
Chernobyl disaster on public attitudes towards nuclear power within the UK resulted 
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from the resistance of attitudes to fundamental change. They reasoned that people’s 
assimilation of information about the Chernobyl accident into existing knowledge 
structures (which in the UK during the 1980s were already comparatively pre-formed) 
had both: (a) dampened the absolute impact of the event on people’s attitudes; and (b) 
shaped the interpretation of the event to conform with existing beliefs about the 
technology (see also Eiser et al., 1990). 
Eiser and colleagues (1995) suggested that while Chernobyl confirmed 
opponents’ existing beliefs that nuclear power was hazardous, proponents of the 
technology (i.e. public supporters and representatives of the British nuclear industry) 
sought to resolve the cognitive inconsistency presented by the accident in ways akin 
to Abelson’s (1959) ‘modes of resolution’ for belief dilemmas: denial, differentiation, 
bolstering and transcendence. More specifically, proponents were seen to defend their 
supportive position by: (a) discounting the event as rare (denial); (b) seeing the event 
as being of limited/less relevance to the UK context (differentiation); (c) by 
emphasising the perceived benefits of nuclear power (bolstering); or (d) by reframing 
the accident as something that would have long-term benefits for the sector as a whole 
(e.g. increased regulation) (transcendence) (see also Abelson et al., 1968). 
In sum, UK polls conducted in the wake of Fukushima indicated fairly short-
lived changes to public support for the technology in the UK. This echoes the results 
of surveys conducted in the wake of Chernobyl. Taken together, these findings 
suggest that in spite of the magnitude of the Fukushima disaster, people’s general 
attitudes towards nuclear power in the UK showed little long-term change. With this 
in mind it appears as though extant supporters of nuclear power in the UK had 
managed to reconcile the disaster in order to retain a supportive position.  
1.3 The current research 
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The present research was conducted on a convenience sample of respondents 
from Sheffield, UK, approximately one-month after the Fukushima disaster (April-
May, 2011). Reporting on the disaster was still prominent within the news media at 
this time. The study used an online survey-based method and was designed to 
understand more about how nuclear power supporters might have reconciled the news 
of Fukushima in order to retain a favourable attitude.  
In contrast to traditional energy surveys, which ask participants to register 
their opinions towards different electricity generation options (e.g. nuclear power, 
coal power) in isolation from one another; the current research included an ‘electricity 
calculator’ task as a primary dependent variable (see Jones, Eiser & Gamble, 2012). 
This task allows for the simultaneous investigation of preferences for a number of 
energy options in a context where rejection of all options is not feasible. In doing so 
the ‘electricity calculator’ provides insight into the trade-offs that people will endorse 
or tolerate when faced with the challenge of meeting a specified goal (e.g. 
hypothetical demand for electricity) from a restricted number of options.  
The added realism provided by comparative and/or scenario-based methods 
(like the ‘electricity calculator’) means that they are becoming an increasingly popular 
means of assessing public attitudes towards complex issues, including energy system 
change (see Fleishman, Bruine, de Bruin & Morgan, 2010; Parkhill, Demski, Butler, 
Spence & Pidgeon, 2013; Truelove, 2012). 
2. Method 
2.1 Participants and recruitment 
One-hundred and forty respondents completed an online survey distributed via 
an email list of volunteers at the University of Sheffield. The survey was distributed 
about one month after the Fukushima accident (20/04/11- 20/05/11) and was 
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advertised as investigating opinions about current and future electricity generation in 
the UK. The survey took approximately 10-15 minutes to complete. The volunteers 
list used to recruit respondents directly contacts all staff (academic and non-academic) 
and students (postgraduate and undergraduate) who have not opted out of receiving 
emails about volunteering opportunities.  
Of the 146 respondents, 76 (54.3%) were male and 64 (45.7%) were female. 
Respondents were aged between 21 and 63years old (M = 40 years; SD = 11.6 years). 
The majority of respondents (n = 129, 92.1 %) felt that either ‘some’ or ‘every’ action 
should be taken to mitigate climate change; nine respondents (6.5%) thought that 
either ‘no’ or ‘other’ action should be taken, and two (1.4%) were unsure. All 
respondents’ claimed they had some knowledge of UK power generation; however, 
only 30% (n = 42) stated having ‘a fair amount’ or ‘a lot’ of knowledge, the other 
70% (n = 98) having ‘some’ or ‘very little’ knowledge.  
The majority of respondents classified themselves as British (n = 125, 89.3%), 
with eight (5.7%) coming from other European countries and two (1.4%) from non-
European countries (n = 5, 3.6% of respondents did not respond). In terms of 
ethnicity, 131 (93.5%) classified themselves as White, with six (4.3%) classifying 
themselves as being of Black or Asian heritage (n = 3, 2.1% of respondents did not 
respond). 
Around two-thirds of respondents (n = 88, 62.9%) registered a clear political 
voting preference. Of these, there were 14 Conservative (centre-right), 23 Liberal 
Democrat (centre), 31 Labour (centre-left), and 16 Green Party (left) voters with four 
who registered voting preferences for other parties (e.g. UK Independence Party). The 
remaining participants were either not politically active, had no preference or 
withheld their voting preference (n = 52, 37.1%).  
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2.2 Procedure  
2.2.1 Initial (pre-mix) information. Upon following the link to the online 
survey respondents received further instructions about the survey and were made 
aware of the focus on nuclear power. Respondents were first asked to register their 
support for the use of five energy sources used in UK power generation (i.e., coal, 
gas, nuclear, renewables, and electricity import) (5-point scales: Strongly support to 
Strongly oppose) before receiving brief information about: (a) the general importance 
of energy for the UK; (b) the fact that the UK electricity mix contains nuclear power; 
and (c) the UK government’s view that nuclear power should continue to play a role 
in UK power generation.  
2.2.2 The ‘electricity calculator’ task. Respondents then completed the 
‘electricity calculator’ task.1 During the task, respondents were asked to create their 
preferred electricity generating mix for the UK using the five energy sources to which 
they had just registered their level of support (see Figure 2). Respondents created their 
electricity mix by adjusting sliding scales associated with the various energy sources 
to their preferred level. The contribution made by each of the sources was initially set 
to 0%. Respondents had to meet 100% of hypothetical demand before they could 
                                                 
1
 Before completing the task, respondents were randomly assigned to one of three ‘framing’ conditions 
(replicating Jones et al., 2012) with the intention of investigating the effect that short passages of text 
(focussed on the carbon-reduction [climate frame] or energy security [security frame] potential of 
nuclear power vs. a control condition) would have on the preferred electricity mixes of respondents 
(see Jones et al., 2012 for details of the passages used). One-way ANOVAs indicated that respondents’ 
initial preferences for each energy source (ps ≥ .53) and their reliance on each source in the ‘electricity 
calculator’ task did not differ significantly between conditions (ps ≥ .22). This latter finding indicated 
that the framing had had no appreciable impact on respondents’ decisions and thus the conditions were 
pooled for the subsequent analysis.  
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proceed and could not be more than 50% reliant on any one energy source. These 
restrictions ensured that respondents had to be reliant on at least two of the energy 
sources to create a viable electricity mix (for full details of the task, see Jones et al., 
2012). 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
2.2.3 Questionnaire-based survey. After completing the ‘electricity 
calculator’ task, respondents were asked to respond to a series of survey questions 
before receiving a full, automated debrief about the study aims. The following section 
details of the survey items that were used in the subsequent statistical analysis (see 
Appendix 1 for full wording and response options).  
Energy source preferences. Respondents first commented on their decisions 
within the ‘electricity calculator’ task. Specifically they were asked about the extent to 
which they agreed or disagreed that they had sought to: (a) ‘limit the contribution 
made by [energy source]’ and (b) ‘meet a large proportion of demand with [energy 
source]’ each of the available energy sources (coal and gas were considered together 
as ‘fossil fuels’). Having reverse coded the ‘limit the contribution’ items, the pairs of 
items relating to each energy source showed good to excellent internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s alphas, α ≥ .69). Thus, composite ‘calculator decision’ measures were 
formed for each of the energy source options. 
Contextual features. Respondents were also required to register their beliefs 
about the extent to which their ‘electricity calculator’ decisions had been influenced 
by: (a) the information preceding the ‘electricity calculator’ task (pre-mix 
information); (b) the Fukushima accident; (c) their knowledge about the contribution 
made by nuclear to UK power generation; and (d) the absence of a demand reduction 
option within the task. This latter item was included in case the lack of a demand 
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reduction option within the task had artificially elevated respondents’ reliance on 
nuclear power as they attempted to create a viable mix.  
General trust and knowledge. Respondents were then asked to register their 
self-proclaimed knowledge about UK power generation and to answer six questions 
relating to their trust in the UK government regarding new nuclear build. The trust 
items specifically related to government transparency and responsiveness around 
policy and siting decisions regarding future nuclear power stations in the UK. These 
six items formed a single reliable measure of ‘general trust’ (Cronbach’s alpha, α = 
.95).   
Climate change and energy security. Respondents were required to register 
their level of (dis-)agreement in the belief that each of climate change and energy 
security present critical challenges for the UK; and their level of (dis-) agreement that 
nuclear power could play an important role in reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions and improving security and reliability of energy supply. Respondents were 
also asked to register their general opinions about the extent of the action needed, if 
any, to address climate change. 
Post-disaster nuclear power belief scale. Respondents completed an adapted 
version of Eiser and colleagues’ (1989) 16 item nuclear power belief scale used to 
assess people’s opinions of nuclear power following the Chernobyl disaster. The scale 
comprised items assessing respondents’ levels of agreement or disagreement with 
statements relating to the risks of future nuclear accidents and the viability, utility and 
importance of nuclear power to the UK (e.g. “There’s nowhere in Europe that is safe 
from the effects of nuclear accident” and “Nuclear power stations are far cleaner 
than any other kind of power station”).  
RUNNING HEAD: Reconciling nuclear risk 
 
12 
 
Demographics. Respondents provided their age, gender, nationality, political 
voting preference and ethnic origin. 
3. Results 
3.1 Pre-Fukushima vs. Post-Fukushima analysis 
To gauge what impact Fukushima might have had upon comparative 
preferences for nuclear power in UK power generation (vs. other energy options), the 
responses from our post-Fukushima sample were compared with those of a separate 
pre-Fukushima sample recruited one year before the disaster (07/01/10 - 20/04/10) 
(see Jones et al., 2012, Study 3). While the pre- and post-Fukushima samples were 
recruited via different means, between-subjects comparisons revealed that the 
respondents were comparable in terms of their mean age (p = .21), gender (p = .06), 
perceived need for action on climate change (p = .42) and attitudes toward the five 
energy sources in the electricity calculator (p = .21 to p = .50) (see Table 1 for 
relevant means, SDs and t-values).  
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Independent samples t-tests performed on the electricity calculator decisions 
revealed that the pre- and post-Fukushima groups were responding similarly with 
regards to their inclusion of Coal, t(233) = 0.41, p = .68; Gas, t(233) = 1.17, p = .24; 
Nuclear, t(233) = 1.10, p = .27; and Renewables, t(233) = 0.45, p = .65. Respondents 
in the post-Fukushima group did, however, include significantly less electricity 
import, t(233) = 2.26, p = .03. See Figure 3 for the mean ‘electricity calculator’ mixes 
for the pre- and post-Fukushima groups. 
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
While care should be taken in drawing conclusions about the stability of 
individual attitudes from these comparisons (due to the between-subjects nature of the 
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design); at an aggregate level the evident similarities in the energy preferences of our 
pre- and post-Fukushima samples would appear to be consistent with the findings of 
national polls (e.g., Foratom, 2014; Ipsos MORI, 2011), which indicate that the 
Fukushima accident had a fairly nominal impact on attitudes to nuclear power in the 
UK. 
3.2 Post-Fukushima nuclear power ‘supporter’ vs. ‘other’ analysis 
Analysis of attitudes towards nuclear power in the post-Fukushima sample 
revealed that half the sample (51.4%, n = 72) were supportive of the use of nuclear 
power in UK power generation, while 17.9% (n = 25) were neither supportive nor 
opposed to its use, and 28.6% (n = 40) were opposed (2.1% did not respond to this 
question and were removed from the subsequent analyses). Of particular interest to 
this research question was how supporters of nuclear power had retained a pro-nuclear 
attitude following Fukushima, so the sample was collapsed into two broad groups for 
the subsequent analyses: ‘supporters’ (n = 72) and ‘others’ (n = 65). 
3.2.1 Electricity mix analysis. Independent samples t-tests were used to 
compare the preferred electricity mixes of the ‘supporters’ and ‘others’. See Figure 4 
for the mean electricity mixes created by each group. While there were significant 
differences in the groups’ use of gas (p < .001), nuclear power (p < .001), renewables 
(p < .001) and electricity import (p = .001); there was no significant difference in the 
relative reliance on coal (p = .57) (see Table 2 for relevant means, SDs and t-values). 
In spite of the Fukushima accident, ‘supporters’ favoured a principal reliance on 
nuclear power (36.5%) and renewables (30.3%), while ‘others’ favoured a principal 
reliance on renewables (44.6%) and gas (23.2%).  
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
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3.2.2 Post-mix questionnaire responses. Independent samples t-tests were 
conducted to investigate the extent to which participants in each attitude group (i.e. 
‘supporters’ vs. ‘others’) indicated that their decisions within the ‘electricity 
calculator’ task had been affected by: (1) their energy source preferences; and (2) 
contextual features relating to the task. Similar tests were also used to compare the 
groups in terms of their post-mix responses on items relating to: (3) general trust and 
knowledge and (4) climate change and energy security (see Section 2.2.3 for details). 
For the means, standard deviations, t-values and p-values for all tests, see Table 2.  
Energy source preferences. Responses corroborated the trends seen in the 
preferred mixes of each participant group. ‘Supporters’ registered a strong desire to 
meet demand through nuclear power, while the ‘others’ wished to avoid reliance on 
nuclear power. Both groups favoured a high reliance on renewables, however, the 
‘others’ were significantly more preferable to their use. Both groups rejected a 
reliance on electricity import; however, the ‘supporters’ were significantly less 
preferable to its use. There was no difference in terms of participants’ stated reliance 
on the ‘fossil fuels’, with both groups favouring a fairly low reliance on these sources. 
Contextual features. The ‘others’ were more likely than ‘supporters’ to 
believe that Fukushima had reduced their reliance on nuclear power. However, a one-
sample t-test (vs. scale midpoint) showed that ‘supporters’ on average also agreed that 
Fukushima led them towards a slightly reduced reliance on nuclear power, t(71) = 
2.09, p = .04. ‘Supporters’ agreed that both the pre-mix information and their 
knowledge of the extant contribution made by nuclear power to UK electricity 
generation had increased their reliance on nuclear power in the task. The ‘others’ 
believed that both these factors had not effected their decisions. Both groups agreed 
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that the lack of a demand reduction option had not affected their decisions within the 
task. 
Climate change and energy security. Each group agreed that tackling climate 
change and ensuring energy security were critical challenges for the UK. While the 
‘others’ were more concerned about the issue of climate change relative to the 
‘supporters’, the opposite was true with regards to energy security. ‘Supporters’ 
tended to agree that nuclear power could help to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions and increase energy security, while the ‘others’ were more sceptical about 
the utility of nuclear power in both these regards. 
Knowledge and trust. ‘Supporters’ claimed to know more than the ‘others’ 
about how electricity is generated in the UK. Both groups were equally ambivalent in 
terms of their general trust in government regarding new nuclear build.  
3.2.3 Post-disaster nuclear power belief items. Responses to the 16 items 
assessing respondents beliefs about nuclear power in the UK (see Eiser et al., 1989; 
1995) were then analysed. Anti-nuclear items were reverse coded so that higher 
values for all items equated to more favourable evaluations of nuclear power.2 While 
the 16-item scale had excellent internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha, α = .93), in 
order to understand more about nature of public opinion in the wake of Fukushima, 
we divided this scale into four sub-scales based upon the principal themes of the 
items: (a) general safety (items: 1, 4, 14, 15); (b) necessity of nuclear power for UK 
power generation (items: 2, 5, 12, 16); (c) socio-economic importance of nuclear 
power (items: 3, 9, 13); and (d) nuclear disaster risk (items: 6, 7, 8, 10). Each of these 
sub-scales had acceptable to excellent internal consistency (Cronbach’s alphas, α ≥ 
                                                 
2
 Don’t know (DK) responses were treated as missing data for this analysis: Item 13 = 27 (19.7%); item 
15 = 18 (13.1%); items 4 & 14 = 14 (10.2%). The remaining items had < 14 DK responses (<10%). 
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.67) and so the items relating to each theme were collapsed to form composite 
measures for use in the subsequent analysis. For Cronbach’s alpha values and 
‘supporter’ and ‘other’ means for each composite measure, see Table 3.  
Independent samples t-tests of the composite items revealed that ‘supporters’ 
were more preferable to nuclear power on all counts (ps < .001). That is, ‘supporters’ 
were: (a) more confident in the general safety of the UK nuclear power industry; (b) 
more convinced of the necessity of nuclear power for UK power generation; (c) more 
assured of the socio-economic importance of nuclear power to the UK; and (d) less 
convinced of the likelihood of a future Fukushima-type nuclear disaster occurring (at 
least in Europe or the UK). See Table 3 for relevant means, t-values and p-values. 
3.3 Identifying the key predictors of the reliance on nuclear power within the 
‘electricity calculator’ task 
A hierarchical multiple linear regression (MLR) analysis (pairwise deletion) 
was conducted to evaluate the extent of the impact of each of the abovementioned 
variables on respondents’ inclusion of nuclear power within the ‘electricity calculator’ 
task. We were interested in which variables would remain predictive of respondents’ 
inclusion of nuclear power in the task in addition to their initial (i.e. pre-mix) attitude 
grouping (i.e. ‘supporter’ vs. ‘other’). Thus, controlling for initial attitude group 
(dummy coded: ‘supporters’ 1; ‘others’ 0) at Step 1, we entered each of the following 
continuous variables as independent predictors of nuclear power inclusion (Step 2).3  
Contextual features 
                                                 
3
 The post-mix ‘energy source preference’ item relating to inclusion of nuclear power was not 
included. While strongly correlated with respondents’ reliance on nuclear power to meet demand in the 
‘electricity calculator’ task, r(137) = .85, p < .001; this item did not shed light on the underlying 
reasons as to why respondents did or did not favour a reliance on this option. 
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1. Impact of Fukushima accident on inclusion of nuclear in ‘electricity 
calculator’. 
2. Impact of pre-mix information on inclusion of nuclear in ‘electricity 
calculator’. 
3. Impact of knowledge of role that nuclear has in UK power generation on 
inclusions of nuclear in ‘electricity calculator’. 
Climate change and energy security 
4. Perceived criticality of climate change as challenge for UK. 
5. Perceived value of nuclear power in reducing GHG emissions. 
6. Perceive criticality of security of energy supply as challenge for UK. 
7. Perceived value of nuclear power in improving security of energy supply. 
General trust and knowledge 
8. General trust in UK government in pursuing new nuclear build.  
9. Self-proclaimed knowledge of UK power generation.  
Nuclear power belief items  
10. General safety of nuclear power (nuclear belief sub-scale 1) 
11. Necessity of nuclear power for UK (nuclear belief sub-scale 2) 
12. Socio-economic importance of nuclear power (nuclear belief sub-scale 3) 
13. Nuclear disaster risk (nuclear belief sub-scale 4) 
For model summary details including all b-values, SEs, beta-values, t-values 
and significances, see Table 4.  
Initial attitude group was found to be a strong predictor of respondents’ 
inclusion of nuclear power in the ‘electricity calculator’ task, accounting for 52.8% 
(adj.) of the variance (Step 1). The addition of the other variables at Step 2 
significantly improved the explanatory power of the model, with 69.5% (adj.) of the 
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variance accounted for. In addition to initial attitude grouping (p = .014), three 
variables were retained as significant positive predictors of inclusion of nuclear 
power: (a) necessity of nuclear power (nuclear belief sub-scale 2) (p = .002); (b) self-
proclaimed knowledge of UK power generation (p = .006); and (c) the belief that 
nuclear power could enhance security of energy supply (p = .033).  The implications 
for these findings are discussed below. 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]    
4. Discussion 
The aim of this study was to: (a) track how comparative preferences for 
nuclear power might have been affected by the Fukushima disaster; and (b) to 
investigate how ‘supporters’ reconciled their attitudinal position in the aftermath of 
the accident. While recognising the limitations of the size and convenience nature of 
the sample, we feel that the timing of the research (one month after Fukushima) and 
the nature of the measures used within the survey provide interesting insight into both 
these issues.  
4.1 Pre-Fukushima vs. Post-Fukushima comparisons 
While our pre- and post-disaster samples were recruited in different ways, 
there were notable similarities between them on some key demographic and attitude 
variables (e.g., mean age, gender, perceived need for action on climate change and 
mean attitudes to the five energy sources in the electricity calculator). 
The comparative analysis of ‘electricity calculator’ preferences within our pre-
Fukushima and post-Fukushima samples indicated no significant differences between 
these groups in terms of their relative preferences for coal, gas, renewables and 
nuclear power in UK power generation. On average, both groups favoured a principal 
reliance on renewables (37-38%), a moderate reliance on gas (17-19%) and nuclear 
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power (21-24%) and low reliance on coal (12%). The only significant difference was 
with respect to preferences for electricity import with the post-Fukushima group (7%) 
opting for a significantly lower reliance on this source (10%). While speculative, this 
latter finding could have been a response to the Fukushima disaster, with post-
Fukushima respondents opting for a reduced reliance on ‘risky’ import from other 
countries in favour of ‘safer’ domestic power generation 
While care should be taken in deriving conclusions about the stability of 
individual preferences for electricity generation options (including nuclear power) 
from this study – due to the between-subjects nature of the comparisons (see Midden 
& Verplanken, 1990) – at an aggregated level one could tentatively view our findings 
as confirming the relative stability of comparative preferences for nuclear power 
following Fukushima (even 1-2 months after the accident).  
While perhaps surprising, this suggestion would not only mirror the apparent 
resilience of UK public opinion post-Chernobyl (e.g. De Boer & Catsburg, 1988; 
Eiser et al., 1995) but would fit with the ostensibly temporary nature of the shifts in 
public approval for nuclear power seen in the UK polls conducted in the wake of 
Fukushima (e.g. Foratom, 2014; Ipsos MORI, 2011, 2012).  
4.2 Post-Fukushima analysis: ‘Supporters’ vs. ‘others’ 
Just over half of our respondents (51.4%) stated they were either supportive or 
strongly supportive of the use of nuclear power in UK, post-Fukushima. Consistent 
with this position, ‘supporters’ showed a greater reliance on nuclear power in the 
‘electricity calculator’ task relative to the ‘others’ (36% vs. 10%, respectively) and 
tended to agree that they had purposefully sought to be reliant on this energy source 
within the task. Thus, in spite of the unfolding events at Fukushima, a large number of 
our post-Fukushima respondents were not only supportive of the continued use of 
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nuclear power in the UK but, within the parameters set out in the ‘electricity 
calculator’ task, wished the UK to be principally reliant on this energy source.  
Importantly, it was not the case that ‘supporters’ were ignorant to the events at 
Fukushima – there was evidence that the accident had made them consider the extent 
to which they included nuclear power in their preferred mix – but the absolute impact 
of the disaster on ‘supporter’ preferences within our sample for nuclear power was 
small. This is similar to the findings of research conducted in the UK immediately 
following Chernobyl (see Eiser et al., 1989). 
Taken together, these findings indicate that the ‘supporters’ within our post-
Fukushima sample were effectively able to reconcile the events at Fukushima in order 
to retain a ‘pro-nuclear’ stance. 
4.3 How did ‘supporters’ retain their pro-nuclear attitudes? 
Relative to the ‘others’, the ‘supporters’ were significantly more favourable to 
nuclear power on all the survey measures included in this study. ‘Supporters’ tended 
to agree that nuclear power was: (a) of use in tackling GHG emissions from power 
generation; (b) an option that could improve security of energy supply in the UK; (c) 
something of socio-economic importance to the UK, and (d) essential for UK power 
generation. Moreover, ‘supporters’ tended to show: (e) greater confidence in the 
safety of nuclear power and the UK nuclear power industry; and (f) lower perceived 
risk of future nuclear disasters (of the type and magnitude of Fukushima). 
While this is perhaps to be expected, our subsequent multiple linear regression 
(MLR) analyses enabled the investigation of which beliefs in particular were 
underpinning respondents’ inclusion of nuclear power in the ‘electricity calculator’ 
task and therefore which beliefs in particular might be being used by ‘supporters’ in 
RUNNING HEAD: Reconciling nuclear risk 
 
21 
 
order to defend their supportive position, i.e. to resolve the belief-dilemma created by 
Fukushima (see Abelson 1959; Abelson et al., 1968).  
4.3.1  Knowledge and the perceived necessity of nuclear power. In addition 
to initial attitude grouping (i.e. general support or opposition for nuclear power in UK 
power generation), three items were retained as predictors of nuclear preferences 
within the ‘electricity calculator’ task: (1) the perceived necessity of nuclear power as 
a generating option for the UK; (2) respondents’ self-claimed knowledge of UK power 
generation; and (3) the perceived value of nuclear power in addressing security of 
energy supply issues.  
Necessity of nuclear power. Retention of the perceived necessity of nuclear 
power within the regression model makes intuitive sense. It stands to reason that those 
who perceived nuclear power to be integral to UK power generation should wish to be 
more reliant on nuclear power within the ‘electricity calculator’ task and vice versa. 
However, while intuitive, we argue that the retention of this variable within the MLR 
in addition to initial attitude grouping perhaps also reflects the comparative nature of 
the decision-making context afforded by the ‘electricity calculator’ task.  
Specifically, the items making up the necessity of nuclear power sub-scale 
generally pitched nuclear power against alternative energy-generating options (e.g. 
“alternative technologies are a more sensible investment than nuclear power”, 
“nuclear power is the only practical source of energy for the future”, etc.). It is 
possible that the opportunity to directly compare nuclear power with a number of 
alternatives in the ‘electricity calculator’ task may have further emphasised the 
necessity of this option for ‘supporters’, while perhaps simultaneously confirming the 
attractiveness, viability and availability of alternative options for the ‘others’.  
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Knowledge of UK power generation. Retention of knowledge of UK power 
generation within the regression model is interesting. On the surface this finding 
would argue that those who considered themselves to be more knowledgeable about 
power generation (in our case the ‘supporters’) were willing to be more reliant on 
nuclear power in the ‘electricity calculator’ task. If true, and greater knowledge was 
driving greater endorsement of nuclear power in the ‘electricity calculator’ task, then 
this finding could help to validate the use of educational campaigns as a potential 
means of improving support for – or at least tolerance of – nuclear power (e.g. akin to 
the UK consultation on nuclear power, see Department of Business and Regulatory 
Reform [DBERR], 2008; Department of Trade and Industry [DTI], 2007). 
There are, however, important caveats to this conclusion. Not only is there 
growing awareness of the weaknesses of knowledge deficit models in explaining 
public attitudes towards science and technology (see Sturgis & Allum, 2004) but 
assessment of ‘knowledge’ within the current study was subjective rather than 
objective (i.e. we did not assess participants’ actual knowledge of UK electricity 
generation but relied on their self-claimed expertise). It is possible, therefore, that 
‘supporters’ were simply using a self-serving justification of greater knowledge – as 
opposed to superior objective knowledge per se – in order to defend their level of 
reliance on nuclear power (e.g. choice-supportive bias, see Henkel & Mather, 2007; 
see also Festinger, 1962). If true, then there is no guarantee that attempts to increase 
objective knowledge of the nuclear power will necessarily yield greater support for 
the technology (see Huijts, Molin & Steg, 2011). Support for this conclusion comes 
from recent research by Visschers & Wallquist (2013) which demonstrated that 
nuclear power supporters and opponents had similar levels of objective knowledge of 
the technology (vs. more ambivalent individuals).  
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Thus, while our study did show a significant association between subjective 
knowledge of UK electric power generation and endorsement of nuclear power, we 
would argue that further research is needed to establish which aspect(s) of 
respondents’ objective knowledge (if any) might also be driving this association. 
Security of energy supply. Retention of this item in the MLR arguably reflects 
both rising public concern with energy security in the UK and the also the conditional 
nature of support that people have for nuclear power.  More specifically, not only has 
recent research confirmed that energy security a growing concern for the UK public 
(Demski, Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2014) but it also indicates that people’s support of 
nuclear power tends to be conditional on the technology’s perceived utility in 
addressing key issues, including energy security and climate change (e.g., Corner et 
al., 2011; Poortinga et al. 2014; Truelove & Greenberg, 2013).  
We suggest that within the ‘electricity calculator’ task, the requirement to 
meet electricity demand may have highlighted the issue of energy security to 
respondents. This concern could have been further augmented by perceived ‘security’ 
risks with some of the available energy-source options (e.g. perceived intermittency of 
renewables and/or the risks associated with high reliance on electricity import). If 
true, this context could have prompted those with greater confidence in the utility of 
nuclear power to address security of supply issues (in our case the ‘supporters’) to opt 
for a higher reliance on this option in the task.  
We did, however, use a fairly general definition of energy security in the 
current study (i.e. respondents were asked to consider nuclear power in terms of its 
potential to contribute to “secure and reliable” energy supplies). This should be 
considered when making generalizations from the current research. Indeed, recent 
research has shown energy security to be a complex (Chester, 2010) and emerging 
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concept within public discourse (Demski et al., 2014). As such, we feel that further 
research is required to confirm which facets of energy security are likely to shape 
(post-Fukushima) endorsement of nuclear power.  
4.4 Limitations 
 A limitation of the current study pertains to the manner by which the post-
Fukushima sample was recruited. In comparison to the pre-Fukushima sample – 
recruited via a nationally representative survey (see Spence et al., 2010) – post-
Fukushima respondents comprised a convenience sample of university staff and 
students recruited via an email volunteers list. While this sampling strategy was 
favoured in order to respond quickly to the unfolding events in Fukushima, there are 
clear implications for the direct generalizability of the findings from this research. For 
instance, our sample is very likely to contain a disproportionate number of people 
with graduate and postgraduate degrees, compared to the average UK population. This 
in-and-of-itself might have contributed to the retention of ‘knowledge of UK power 
generation’ as a predictor in the MLR. We contend, however, that while care should 
clearly be taken when translating our current findings to non-university samples, the 
evident similarities in the pre- and post-Fukushima respondents’ pre-mix support for 
the energy sources used in the ‘electricity calculator’ task, alongside the similar 
gender and age distributions, do offer some assurances about the broader 
generalizability of the research findings. 
 Relatedly, the results from the MLR analysis should be taken in context when 
seeking to generalize from this aspect of the study. It is possible that the findings will 
have been influenced by the options available to respondents within the ‘electricity 
calculator’ task.  For instance, while we feel that the ‘electricity calculator’ succeeds 
in increasing the reality of the decision making context (see also Fleishman et al., 
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2010), the availability of just five broadly-defined energy-options might have served 
to amplify the relationship between the perceived necessity of nuclear power and 
respondents’ inclusion of nuclear power in their preferred energy mix. It is possible 
that with a greater number of more specified options (e.g., coal with CCS and/or 
distinguishing between different renewables), that this relationship may have 
weakened. Conversely, it could be argued that in a more complex scenario that the 
relevance of knowledge of UK power generation as a predictor might have been 
further augmented. We feel that future research could usefully explore these 
questions. 
4.5 Conclusion  
The results of this study appear to support the findings of a number of polls 
conducted in the UK following the Fukushima disaster, which indicated that this event 
had only a muted impact on support for nuclear power. More significantly, however, 
we feel that the results provide insight into the reasons why ‘supporters’ of nuclear 
power in particular were able to retain a supportive position in the wake of such a 
disaster. Specifically, it appears that ‘supporters’ bolstered (i.e. emphasised) the 
necessity of the technology as a means of providing secure and adequate supplies of 
electricity for the UK. We feel that evidence for such bolstering was highlighted by 
our use of a comparative decision-making scenario (i.e., the ‘electricity calculator’ 
task), which would have emphasised the relative weaknesses of alternative options 
(e.g., renewables, gas, electricity import) in this regard. 
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Appendix 1: Questions completed following ‘electricity calculator task 
A1. ‘Electricity calculator’ decision items 
Questions to assess the reasons for inclusion of nuclear power and other energy 
sources in the ‘electricity calculator’.  
(a) Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the 
following statements about your electricity mix. My chosen electricity mix was 
principally influenced by a desire to…  
- meet a large proportion with: (1) renewables; (2) fossil fuels (i.e. coal & 
gas); (3) electricity import; (4) nuclear power. 
- limit the contribution to demand made by:  (5) renewables; (6)  fossil fuels 
(i.e. coal & gas); (7) electricity import; and (8) nuclear power (5-point 
scales: strongly agree; agree; neither agree nor disagree; disagree; strongly 
disagree + don’t know). 
Note: responses to ‘limit contribution’ items were reverse coded and 
combined with their respective ‘meet demand’ items. 
(b) How much do you feel you know about how electricity is generated in the UK 
today? (5-point scale: Know a lot; Know a fair amount; Have some 
knowledge; Know very little; Know nothing at all + ‘don’t know’). 
(c) To what extent to you feel each of the following things increased or reduced 
your use of nuclear power in your mix? (1) The information you received 
about nuclear power before creating your electricity mix; (2) The recent 
nuclear crisis at the Fukushima 1 nuclear power plant in Japan; (3) The 
absence of a demand-reduction option in the electricity mix task; and (4) 
Personal knowledge of the current contribution made by nuclear power to the 
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UKs actual electricity mix (5-point scale: substantially reduced; slightly 
reduced; no effect; increased; slightly increased). 
A2. Energy security & climate change concern and trust in the UK government   
Questions about respondents’ levels of trust in the UK government regarding new 
nuclear build, opinions about the use of nuclear power to combat climate change & 
improve energy security and beliefs in the general need for action on climate change. 
(a) To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements: 
(1) tackling climate change is a critical challenge for the UK; (2) nuclear 
power stations could make an important contribution to reducing the UK’s 
CO2 emissions; (3) ensuring a secure and reliable supply of energy is a critical 
challenge for the UK; (4)  nuclear power stations could make an important 
contribution to providing the UK with secure and reliable energy supplies for 
the future (5-point scale: strongly agree; agree; neither agree nor disagree; 
disagree; strongly disagree + don’t know). 
(b) With respect to nuclear power, to what extent do you trust the UK government 
to: (1) Keep the public informed of the plans for nuclear power as they 
develop; (2) Seek public opinion about the role nuclear power should play in 
the future energy mix for the UK; (3) Take public views into account; (4) Tell 
the truth about any risks that might be involved; (5) Keep the public’s interests 
at heart; and (6) Act fairly when choosing where nuclear power stations should 
be sited? (5-point scale: definitely yes; yes; neither yes or no; no; definitely no 
+ ‘don’t know’).  
(c) Which, if any, of the following statements most closely describes your own 
opinion about taking action against climate change: (1) Every possible action 
should be taken against climate change; (2) Some action should be taken 
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against climate change; (3) No action should be taken against climate change; 
(4) None of these; and (5) Don’t know. 
A3. Post-disaster nuclear power belief scale 
Adapted version of Eiser et al.’s (1989) 16 item scale used to assess opinions of 
nuclear power following the Chernobyl disaster. The items were modified so as to 
make reference to Fukushima and Japan, rather than Chernobyl and Soviet Union, 
respectively. We also referred to nuclear power and the UK, rather than nuclear 
energy and Britain, respectively. 
(a) On 11th March 2011 a strong earthquake occurred off the east coast of Japan. 
This subsequently caused a large tsunami (or tidal wave) to hit the coast of 
Japan, causing severe destruction and damaging a series of nuclear reactors at 
Japans Fukushima 1 nuclear power plant. The following questions relate to 
you opinions about the recent events at Fukushima. Please rate the extent of 
your agreement or disagreement with each of the following statements: 16- 
item attitude scale adapted from Eiser et al. (1989). See Table 3 for statements. 
(5-point scale: strongly agree; agree; neither agree nor disagree; disagree; 
strongly disagree + ‘don’t know’).  
A4. Demographics 
(a) Are you male or female? (Male / Female)  
(b) How old are you? (Free response) 
(c) What is your nationality? (Free response) 
(d) Please state your voting preference. (Conservative / Labour / Liberal 
Democrats / Green / UK Independence Party (UKIP) / Other / None at 
present / Don’t intend to vote / I would prefer not to answer) 
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(e) Please choose the term which you feel most accurately describes your 
ethnic origin. (White-British / White-Irish / White-Other background / 
Black/Black British-Caribbean / Black/Black British-African / Black-
Other background / Asian/Asian British: Indian / Asian/Asian British-
Pakistani / Asian/Asian British-Bangladeshi / Asian/Asian British-Chinese 
/ Asian/Asian British-Other background / Mixed White and Black 
Caribbean / Mixed White and Black African / Mixed White and Asian / 
Mixed Other background / Other ethnic background / I would prefer not to 
answer) 
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Figure 1. UK public support and opposition for nuclear power pre- and post-
Fukushima. Note: Approximate date of Fukushima disaster is depicted by dashed line. 
Source: Ipsos MORI (2012). 
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Figure 2. Diagram of the ‘electricity calculator’ task. Note: For further details of the 
‘electricity calculator’ task, see Jones et al. (2012). 
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Figure 3. Mean ‘electricity calculator’ mixes for the pre- and post-Fukushima groups. 
Note: The pre-Fukushima data comprised participants from Jones et al. (2012, Study 
3). Standard deviations [‘pre’ / ‘post’]: Coal [10.80/9.63]; Gas [12.22/10.46]; Nuclear 
[18.01/16.28]; Renewables [14.70/13.77]; Import [9.61/9.56]. 
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Figure 4. Mean ‘electricity calculator’ mixes for the ‘supporters’ vs. ‘others’. Note: 
Standard deviations [‘supporters’ / ‘others’]: Coal [11.29/10.30]; Gas [10.39/12.93]; 
Nuclear [12.37/12.44]; Renewables [15.29/9.79]; Import [7.18/11.12]. 
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Table 1  
The comparability of the pre- and post-Fukushima samples on key demographics and 
attitudes towards energy sources. 
 
 
PRE-
Fukushima 
POST-
Fukushima 
 
df 
 
t 
 
Sig. (p) 
n 95 140    
Mean age in years (SD) 42.5 (16.8) 40.0 (11.6) 156.11 1.27 .21 
Sex (Male : Female) 39 : 56 76 : 64 Fisher’s Exact  .06 
Climate action (Yes : Other)a 90 : 4 129 : 11 Fisher’s Exact  .42 
      
Mean attitudes towards energy sources (SD) b 
Coal 2.86 (1.01) 2.77 (1.02) 232 0.69  .49 
Gas 3.17 (1.00) 3.26 (1.02) 232 0.67  .50 
Nuclear Power 3.01 (1.30) 3.23 (1.34) 229 1.26  .21 
Renewables 4.49 (0.70) 4.60 (0.78) 233 1.06  .29 
Electric Import 2.73 (0.97) 2.57 (0.97) 220 1.19  .24 
Notes. Pre-Fukushima sample collected via online survey distributed to representative 
sample of British population (see Spence, Venables, Pidgeon, Poortinga, & Demski, 2010).a 
Dichotomous variable: respondents wishing to take ‘some’ or ‘every’ action to mitigate 
climate change (Yes) vs. others (Other). b 5-point scale: 5 (strongly support) to 1 (strongly 
oppose), plus ‘don’t know’ (DK) option. All means discount DK responses.  
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Table 2 
Mean responses to the key post-mix questionnaire items among the ‘supporters’ and ‘others’. 
 Mean (SD)    
 ‘Supporters’ ‘Others’ df t Sig. (p) 
Energy source preferencesa   
Nuclear power (NP) 4.13 (0.80) 1.82 (0.88) 105.25 16.08  .001*** 
Fossil Fuels 2.08 (0.94) 2.05 (0.83) 135 0.15 .88 
Renewables 4.03 (1.07) 4.72 (0.53) 135 4.85 .002** 
Electricity import 1.70 (0.87) 2.16 (0.87) 135 3.08  .003** 
Contextual featuresb    
Fukushima accident 2.86 (0.56) 2.42 (0.98) 99.81 3.21  .002** 
Pre-mix information 3.31 (0.88) 2.94 (0.75) 134.47 2.64  .009** 
Lack of demand reduction option 3.11 (0.72) 3.12 (0.67) 135 0.10 .92 
Knowledge of UK reliance on NP 3.43 (0.85) 2.95 (0.45) 109.70 4.15 .001*** 
General trustc & knowledged   
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Trust in UK government 3.11 (0.95) 2.76 (1.26) 118.57 1.83  .07 
Knowledge of UK power generation 3.33 (0.77) 2.80 (0.81) 135 3.84  .001*** 
Climate change and energy securitya   
Climate change critical challenge for UK 3.93 (1.13) 4.51 (0.77) 126.10 3.52  .001*** 
NP can reduce GHG emissions 4.44 (0.65) 3.22 (1.25) 83.17 6.86  001*** 
Energy security critical challenge for UK 4.72 (0.56) 4.46 (0.61) 130.25 2.58  .011* 
NP can increase security of energy supply 4.46 (0.65) 2.61 (1.13) 92.13 11.32  .001*** 
Notes. a 5-point scale: 5 (strongly agree) to 1 (strongly disagree), plus ‘don’t know’ (DK) option. b 5-point scale: 5 (substantially increased) 
to 1 (substantially reduced). c 5-point scale: 5 (definitely yes) to 1 (definitely no), plus DK option. 5-point scale: 5 (know a lot) to 1 (know 
nothing at all). Means discount DK responses. 
p  < .05*, p < .01**, p < .001*** 
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Table 3  
Mean responses to the four nuclear power belief sub-scales in the ‘supporter’ and ‘other’ groups.  
  
   Mean (SD)   
Theme Description (Item Number) α Supporters Others t Sig. (p) 
General 
safety  
Fears of radiation are out proportion (1) 
The UK nuclear industry can be proud of safety record (4) 
No reason to suppose UK power stations are safer than Japan (14 R) 
UK nuclear power stations operated with safety as top priority (15) 
.69 3.78 
(0.53) 
2.68 
(0.75) 
9.75  .001*** 
       
Necessity 
of nuclear 
power  
Alternative technologies are a more sensible investment (2 R) 
Nuclear power stations are cleaner than other power stations (5)   
UK should abandon plans for more nuclear power stations (12 R)  
Nuclear power is the only practical source of energy for the future (16) 
.84 3.65 
(0.65) 
2.10 
(0.74) 
13.07  .001*** 
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Socio-
economic 
importance  
Nuclear technology has improved ordinary people’s quality of life (3) 
Nuclear power is vital to the UK’s economic future (9) 
Nuclear power is far less economical than its supporters claim (13 R) 
.79 3.82 
(0.57) 
2.59 
(0.90) 
9.26  .001*** 
       
Nuclear 
disaster risk 
There are going to be more nuclear disasters before very long (6 R) 
Fukushima event could happen at any nuclear power station (7 R) 
Scientists would have little idea about impact of future accident (8 R)  
Unlikely there will be another accident as serious as Fukushima (10) 
Nowhere in Europe is safe from the effects of a nuclear accident (11 R) 
.79 3.45 
(0.66) 
2.57 
(0.66) 
7.92  .001*** 
Total Mean All 16 items .93 3.68 
(0.46) 
2.49 
(0.61) 
12.75  .001*** 
Notes. Standard deviations in parentheses. 5-point scale: 5 (strongly agree) to 1 (strongly disagree). Means discount ‘don’t know’ responses 
(missing cases excluded pairwise). Higher values equate to more ‘pro-nuclear’ responses. ‘R’ =  item reverse coded before analysis. 
p  < .05*, p < .01**, p < .001*** 
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Table 4. 
Multiple linear regression showing the impact of initial attitude grouping and other key 
variables on inclusion of nuclear power in the ‘electricity calculator’ task 
 B (SE) β t Sig. (p) 
Step 1a     
Constant 10.22 (1.59)  6.42 .001*** 
Initial attitude group 26.26 (2.20) .73 11.95  .001*** 
Step 2b     
Constant -20.08 (10.54)  1.91 .06 
Initial attitude groupc 7.35 (2.94) .20 2.50 .014* 
Fukushima accident 1.16 (1.35) .05 0.86 .392 
Pre-mix information 0.42 (1.29) .02 0.32 .746 
Knowledge of UK reliance on NP -.035 (1.55) -.01 0.22 .824 
Trust in UK government -1.02 (0.90) -.06 1.13 .259 
Knowledge of UK power generation 3.16 (1.18) .15 2.67 .009** 
Climate change concern 0.65 (0.96) .03 0.49 .629 
NP can reduce GHG emissions 0.47 (1.18) .03 0.40 .690 
Energy security concern -1.60 (1.59) -.05 1.00 .317 
NP can increase security of energy 
supply 
3.22 (1.49) .23 2.17 .033* 
General safety of NP -2.37 (1.91) -.11 1.24 .217 
Necessity of NP 6.30 (2.00) .36 3.16 .002** 
Socio-economic importance of NP 2.75 (1.80) .15 1.53 .130 
Nuclear disaster risk 0.85 (1.68) .04 0.50 .616 
Notes. Nuclear Power (NP). Method = Enter (pairwise deletion). 
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a
 Step 1: Adj. R2= .53, F change (1, 126) = 142.29*** 
b
 Step 2: Adj. R2= .70, F change (13, 113) = 6.32*** 
p  < .05*, p < .01**, p < .001*** 
 
